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indicates that it was unlikely that would agree on a course 
of action during dissolution that would be in their common 
interest. 
[15] Finally, the Crockers contend that the corporation is 
not "in the process of voluntary winding up" because there 
was no notice of a meeting of shareholders (see Corp. 
Code, § 2201, subd. (e) ) and all the shareholders did not 
approve the dissolution in lieu of a special meeting. (See 
Corp. Code, § 2239.) Section 4600 provides for a vote or 
written consent. Sections subdivision (e), and 2239 would 
apply only if the election to dissolve had been by vote rather 
than by written consent. 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1957. 
[8. F. No. 19484. In Bank. Nov. 12, 1957.1 
GEORGE F. FOX III et al., Respondents, v. JAMES P. 
ACED et al., Appellants. 
[la, lb] Exchange of Property-Construction of Contract.-Under 
an agreement for exchange of real property providing that m 
the event either party was unable to deliver his property with-
in 90 days from the date of the contract "upon the terms 
specified" the contract should be void, defendants' obligation 
to complete a building on industrial property pursuant to a 
lease-purchase agreement was not a condition of delivering 
the property under the exchange agreement, and they were 
not released from liability for breach of the exchange agree-
ment on the ground that such building had not been completed, 
where such completion was not expressly provided in defend-
ants' promise to convey the property free and clear of certain 
encumbrances, and where an intent not to include such com-
pletion among "the terms specified" was indicated by defend-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Exchange of Property, § 7; Am.Jur., Trades 
nnd Exchanges of Property, § 13. 
Mc:K. Dig. References: [1, 2] Exchange of Property, § 9; [3] 
Damages, § 136; [4] Exchange of Property, § 39. 
ants' promise, "to complete all 
obligations now [plaintiffs] harm-
less for any and all lessee thereunder." 
[2] !d.-Construction of ambiguity in an adden-
dum to an agreement for the of real property should 
be resolved against the party that wrote the addendum. 
[3] Damages-Exemplary are not 
recoverable against a defendant who acts in faith and 
under the advice of counsel. 
[4] Exchange of Property-Damages.-A finding that defendants' 
breach of their contract for exchange of property was com-
mitted in "bad faith" within the meaning of Civ. Code, § 3306, 
was not sustained where the evidence disclosed that, as a 
result of the construction of a building on defendant's indus-
trial property for the specific use of a tenant, there existed 
at the time the exchange agreement was entered into two liens 
of record, as well as a dispute between defendants and the 
construction company concerning noncompletion of the build-
ing in accordance with plans and specifications, of which plain-
tiffs were aware, that it was because of these factors that the 
exchange agreement provided for a 90-day period for delivery 
of the property, that during this period one defendant un-
successfully made repeated efforts to have the building com-
pleted, and that defendants acted in good faith in relying on 
the advice of counsel in refusing to perform the contract. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Murray Draper, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for breach of a realty exchange con-
tract. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed. 
Wexler & Wexler and Louis E. Wexler for Appellants. 
Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll & Thompson, Robert T. Thomp-
son and Richard C. Amick for Respondents. 
McCOMB, J.-From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs for 
the sum of $2,950 after trial before the court without a jury, 
in an action to recover damages pursuant to the provisions 
of section 3306 of the Civil Code for an alleged breach of an 
agreement for the exchange of real property, defendants 
appeal. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, 
§ 278 et seq. 
and defendants entered into an 
in for cer-
tain industrial were to convey a certain house and 
lot to defendants and pay them $14,000 in cash. The industrial 
was to a lease and purchase agreement be-
tween defendants as lessor-vendor and Sequoia Metalcraft 
and others referred to as ''the ten-
ant") as lessee-vendee. An addendum to the exchange agree-
ment 
"In the event either First Party [plaintiffs] or Second 
Party is unable to deliver his property within 
ninety (90) from the date of this contract, upon the 
terms specified, then this contract shall be null and void and 
each party, in that event, shall hereby release the other of 
and from all liability hereunder. 
"First Party agrees to pay Fourteen Thousand & No/100 
($14,000.00) Dollars cash on closing of this transaction. Rents 
to be prorated thirty (30) days from date of execution of this 
contract and payable on closing. Taxes, insurance, utilities 
and all other expenses relative to the upkeep of the subject 
properties are to be prorated as of the date of closing, which 
is to be no later than ninety (90) days from the date of this 
contract. Each party will pay expenses on property now 
owned by him until actual closing. Second Party agrees to 
complete all obligations now owing to lessee and to hold First 
Party harmless for any and all claims made by lessee there-
under.'' 
The trial court found that (1) defendants breached the 
exchange agreement, and (2) "defendants' failure and re-
fusal to perform said agreement on their part was deliber-
ate, willful, capricious and without just cause and excuse, 
and without just or lawful reason therefor." 
These questions are presented for our determination: 
[la] First. Did defend4nts breach the exchange agreement? 
Yes. Defendants claimed that they were unable within the 
90-day period to deliver the industrial property ''upon the 
terms specified'' and that they were thereby released from 
all liability under the agreement by the provisions of the 
first sentence of the addendum set forth above. 
Defendants \Yere obligated under their lease-purchase agree-
ment with the tenant to construct a building on the industrial 
property, and they predicate their inability to perform the 
exchange agreement upon the ground that the construction 
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""'""t.um: Was the completion of such 
""'JH'·'"'"- ' in the exchange 
It was not expressly so specified in that clause of the agree-
ment whereby defendants promised to convey the industrial 
property ''free and clear of all encumbrances excepting ease-
ments, restrictions and rights of way of record and said 
Lease Agreement and said purchase agreement [between de-
fendants and the tenant] and tax liens which are the re-
sponsibility of the tenant." 
An intent not to include such completion among "the 
terms specified" is indicated by defendants' promise, ex-
pressed in the last sentence of the addendum, ''to complete 
all obligations now owing to lessee and to hold First Party 
[plaintiffs] harmless for any and all claims made by lessee 
thereunder." This promise was calculated to meet the situa-
tion that would obtain if, when the sale was consummated, 
the sellers had not yet completely performed all of their 
obligations toward the tenant, including completion of the 
building. It indicated that the sale was to proceed regardless 
of such completion. [2] The addendum was written by de-
fendants, and any ambiguity should be resolved against them. 
[lb] Likewise, the realtor through whom the parties nego-
tiated testified that defendant James P. Aced explained to him 
that a lien filed against the property by one of the building 
contractors, Marshall Electric Company, was in litigation and 
Mr. Aced explained that he thought he could have this lien 
released quickly but wanted the 90 days to get rid of it, "that 
is why we set up the 90-day closing." It is thus clear that 
performance of defendants' obligation to the tenant to com-
plete the building was not a condition of delivering the 
property. 
The Marshall Electric Company lien was paid off nearly 
30 days before the expiration of the 90-day period; the only 
other lien involved was that of the general building con-
tractor, Carlray Company, in the amount of $10,000-$1,400 
of which defendants disputed as being for extras ordered by 
the tenant. About two weeks before the expiration of the 
90 days, plaintiffs paid the $1,400 on behalf of the tenant 
so that the only remaining lien on the 90th day was one which 
defendant James P. Aced testified he did not question. He 
admitted that he was agreeable to paying it and conceded that 
the lien could have been liquidated by using a portion of the 
money that plaintiffs had already put in escrow to defendants' 
credit. 
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Since defendants failed and refused to convey the property 
to plaintiffs, the of the trial court that they had 
breached the exchange agreement, in view of the aoove evi-
dence. is amply supported by the record. 
Second: Was defendants' breach of the.ir contract com-
mitted ~n "bad fatth" withtn the meaning of that phrase as 
used in sectton 3306 of the Civil Code? 
No. [3] Exemplary damages are not recoverable against 
a defendant who acts in good faith and under the advice of 
counsel. (Selden v. Cashman, 20 Cal. 56,67 [81 Am.Dec 931: 
Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 CaL2d 632, 649 [198 P.2d lj; Fet-
terly v. Salyer, 96 CaLApp.2d 240, 244 [5] [215 P.2d 64]. 
A.bbott v. '76 Land & Water Co., 103 Cal. 607. 609 [37 P 5271: 
Bonesteel v. Bonesteel, 30 Wis. 511, 513; Devenny v. The Mas-
cotte. 72 F 684. 686; ct .Johnson v. Southern Pac Co., 157 
Cal. 333. 338 [107 P 6111; Perry v. Washtngton Nat. Ins. Co .. 
14 Cal.App.2d 609. 617 [71 [58 P.2d 701, 59 P.2d 158]. 
Haydel v. Morton, 19 Cal.App.2d 697,700 [41 [66 P.2d 204). 
United States v. Homestake Mtn. Co., 117 F. 481. 488 [54 
C.C.A. 3031: 25 C.J.S. (1941 ), Damages,§ 123e, p. 727.) 
Section 3306 of the Civil Code reads: ''The detriment 
caused by the breach of an agreement to convey an estate in 
real property, is deemed to be the price paid, and the ex-
penses properly incurred in examining the title and preparing 
the necessary papers, with interest thereon; but adding there-
to, in case of bad faith, the difference between the price agreed 
to be paid and the value of the estate agreed to be conveyed. 
at the time of the breach, and the expenses properly incurred 
in preparing to enter upon the land." (Italics added.) 
[4] The record discloses that for a number of weeks prior 
to July 2, 1954, the parties had been attempting through a 
mutual realtor to agree upon an exchange agreement that was 
satisfactory to all parties concerned. 
The building on defendants' industrial property was con· 
structed for them by Carlray Company for the specific use of 
the tenant. As a result of the construction. there existed at 
the time the exchange agreement was entered into two liens 
of record, as well as a dispute between defendants and Carl· 
ray Company concerning the noncompletion of the building in 
accordance with plans and specifications. 
Pla1ntiffs on .T nly 2. 1954. were aware of the existence of 
the two he'lls of reC'ord. as well as the controversy between 
defendants and Carlray Company. It was because of these 
49 C.2d-13 
c.~ 
factors that the contained this provision: 
or Second Party is unable 
to deliver his property within (90) days from the 
date of this contract, upon the terms specified, theu this con-
tract shall be null aud void and each party, in that event, 
shall release the other of and from all liability here-
under.'' 
referred defendant James P. 
Aced made to have the building completed, 
all without success. 1954, plaintiffs de-
posited their money and deed with the title company. De-
fendants did not succeed in obtaining the completion of the 
building, and they did not, within said 90-day period or at 
any time thereafter, deliver their property to plaintiffs or 
deposit a deed thereto with the title company. 
On numerous occasions during the foregoing transactions 
defendant James P. Aced consulted with an attorney, and 
when it became evident to him that the building would not 
be completed by the builder within the 90-day period, he 
sought his attorney's advice relative to his rights and obliga-
tions under his agreement with plaintiffs. He testified that 
"I was continually going to my attorney two or three times 
a week asking, 'How can I complete this deal,' and I was 
following his advice right down the line." The record also 
discloses that his attorney told him: "It is very clear to me 
that the second wire revqkes the first wire giving you addi-
tional time, that Mr. :F'ox does not want to give you additional 
time and the 90-day period having expired the entire deal 
under the terms of the exchange agreement, by which it states 
that either party may withdraw after 90 days, has terminated 
and there is no further deal.'' 
The evidence likewise discloses that James P. Aced relied 
and acted upon advice of counsel. Since the evidence dis-
closes that defendants acted in good faith in relying upon 
the advice of counsel in refusing to perform their contract, 
the trial court's finding that they acted in bad faith within 
the meaning of section 3306 of the Civil Code is not sustained. 
Hence, to predicate damages upon the bad faith of defendants 
was erroneous. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J .-I dissent. 
I agree with the first point in the majority opinion that it 
was not necessary to complete the building before defendant 
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was obligated to transfer the but cannot agree that 
there was insufficient evidence to show bad faith on the part 
of defendant as used in section 3306 of the Civil Code quoted 
in the majority The trial court found that there 
was bad faith on defendant's in refusing to a:o; 
pointed out in the and, in my the 
evidence was sufficient to support that 
Assuming that advice of which is followed, shows 
good faith and there is evidence that such advice was given 
and followed, there is evidence in the record here which 
clearly shows bad faith. Mr. Ross, the real estate broker 
handling the deal for both parties, testified that during the 
90-day period defendant refused to complete the deal unless 
plaintiffs paid for a rock fill in connrction with the building 
which plaintiffs were not obligated to do; that plaintiffs would 
waive completion of the building; that defendant was not 
''particularly interested'' in having a conference with his 
counsel and Ross; that he wanted a release from the tenant 
of his property under the lease and was told that the tenant 
was willing to accept the buildings; that defendant said he 
"wouldn't close [the deal] in any event. He said, 'There is 
not only the question of the rock fill which hasn't been set-
tled, but' he said that he wasn't going to do business with 
Mr. Fox [plaintiff). I asked Mr. Aced, 'Well, is this just a 
grudge?' and he said, 'No, but I just don't like Mr. Fox.' 
"I asked Mr. Aced, 'Would you close this transaction with 
anybody else'!' He said, 'Anybody else b1tt Mr. Pox.' 
"We spoke on, and I asked Mr. Aced just what it was that 
he wanted at this time to close the deal with Mr. Fox, didn't 
he have any idea of what he wanted. lie thought for a minute, 
and he wrote down seven points which he wanted to close the 
deal with Mr. Pox, and it amounted to appr·oximately $5,000 
or more." (Emphasis added.) The latter things plaintiff was 
not required to do. Defendant knew that the liens on the 
property could be removed by instructing the escrow agent 
to withhold them from the money deposited in escrow by plain-
tiff. The evidence is clear that defendant deliberately refused 
to carry out the agreement. This evidence was weighed by 
the trial court against the evidence that defendant acted on 
the advice of counsel. Hence the judgment is supported by 
the evidence. The evidence that defendant acted on the 
advice of counsel obviously could have been disbelieved by 
the trial court. 
It must be remembered that the test of bad faith under 
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section 3306 of the Civil Code, supra, is whether there is a 
deliberate refusal to perform without just cause or excuse 
(Nelson v. F'ernando Nelson & Sons, 5 Cal.2d 511 [55 P.2d 
'lfi9]; Engasser v . • ]ones, 88 Cal.App.2d 171 [198 P.2d 5461. 
Pixley v. F'irst F'ederal Sav. & Loan Assn .. 110 Cal.App.2d 
427 (243 P.2d 100]; .Johnson v Goldberg, 130 Cal.App.2d 
571 [279 P.2d 131]; Rasmussen v. Moe, 138 Cal.App.2d 49~ 
f292 P.2d 2261) and whether there is good or bad faith 1s a 
question of fact (Rasmussen v. Moe, s1tpra, 138 Cal.App.2d 
t99). 
As stated, proof that a party acted on the advice of counsel 
may be a factor in establishing the defense of good faith 
However, in situations where the advice of counsel is a defense 
against punitive damages, malicious prosecution, and som~=' 
other torts. there must be a full and fair disclosure of all 
the facts to counsel. For illustration it is said: ''Advice of 
counsel. to be admissible evidence in mitigation of damage;; 
in any case. must appear to have been given upon a full an(i 
fair statement of the facts or of such of them as were material 
to the question on which counsel was consulted." (15 Am.Jur .. 
Damages. § 354.) And in regard to malicious prosecution 
·'The solicitation of advice of counsel and the fact that in 
mstituting the action complained of one acted on the opinion 
and advice of counsel may constitute a complete defense to 
an action for malicious prosecution. provided the opinion was 
based on a full and fair statement of the facts or on knowledgt 
rlerived from independent mvesttgation, and was sought and 
acted on tn good faith." (Emphasis added; 32 Cal.Jur.2d. 
Malicious Prosecution. § 25.) ''In order to establish the de-
fence of advice of counseL the defendant in an action foT 
malicious prosecution must show that the advice relied on 
was given by counsel after a full and fair disclosure, withvut 
any suppression, evasion. or falsehood, of all the facts known 
to the complainant. or which he should have known, tending 
to prove or disprove his claim or the crime charged." (Ibid 
~ 29.) "The rule that advice of counsel is a defense to an 
action of malicious prosecution is qualified by the require 
ment that the element of good faith be present throughout 
Advice of counsel. accordingly. affords no defense unless 
it is sought in good faith and not as a mere rloak to protect 
meself against such an action or to refute the theory of 
maHce Such advic0 must have been based on the entire good 
faith of the defendant in the presentation of his facts. It musl 
further appear, affirmatively, that the defendant acted on th~ 
Nov. LEWIS v LEWIS 
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advice rn good faith." (1 bid. .. S 30.) lt is clear that under 
the ev1denee in the instant (•ase the trial court could find, aR 
it did. that there was not a fair or full disclosure of the facts 
hy defendant to his t~ounsel in good faith It certainly cannot 
lw smd that the evidence on this tssue was undisputed ln· 
leed (kfendant 's main c'oneern with his counsel was in con-
lf'(•tion with his with his lessee rather than plaintiff 
Hnrr>over it should b!' observl?d that nndl?r section 3306 oi 
the Civil Code. iR not being allowed pnnitivl? damage' 
If there is had faith. the damage~ recoverabll? are still actuar 
rlamagP!' suffered Hencl? therP iR morP reason why the advict• 
of counsel faetor in ftscertaining good or bad faith should 
meet all the safeguards placed around it in other situations 
Such is not the statp of the recorrl here. 
T would. therefore. affirm the judgment. 
Gibson. C. J .. and 'l'raynor, J ., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1957 Gibson, C. J .. Carter. ,J., and Traynor, J., wert:-
of the opimon that the petition should be granted. 
n~. A. No. 24322. In Bank. Nov. 19. 19fi7.1 
GER'l'RUDE LEW lS, Appellant, v. ULYSSES LEWIS, 
Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Foreign Divorce-Collateral Attack.-A wife who 
secured a .Judgment ot separat~ wamtenancco m [llinms (th~ 
state ot her dormciJe) afte1 the renditiOn ot a valid divoret· 
decree for the husband tn ~evada wa8 not precluded frow 
enforcmg her rrg·ht to support m Califorma. the state of thf' 
husband's present domwile. where the husband did not mvok<' 
the N evadll divorce decree in the Lllmm,. proceeding: even It 
such decree had been pleaded as a defense m that proceedm~ 
and the fllmms court bad erroneously failed to recogmze 1t 
the husband'~ remedy was bv appeal and he cannot attack thf' 
IlhnoJs JUdgment tn ll subsequent proceeding in California to 
enforce thP wif~>'s rig-ht to support. 
(1] See CaLJur.2d, Divorce and Separation. * 315; Am.Jur .. 
Divorce and SeparatiOn. 9 742 et seq. 
McK Dig. References: [ 1] Divorce. ~ 307; [2, 3, 6,] Divorce, 
~ 304; [ 4) Divorce, § 306.1 ; [ 5] Divorce, § 305. 
